Over the last week, a piece of Trump-politik has become clearer: tariffs are now Trump’s favourite political stick. Colombia (the country spelt with an o) was the first target of his tariff threats when its president refused to accept a flight of deportees. Faced with the threat of 25% and then 50% tariffs, the Colombian president relented within 24 hours.
Normally, that would dominate headlines for days, but there wasn’t time. It was quickly followed by Trump’s threat of 25% tariffs on the US’s closest trading partners, Canada and Mexico. A pair of 11 th hour deals postponed that for 30 days. As for the UK, while name-checked, they are not in the crosshairs just yet – but the anxiety is growing.
The 20% universal tariff Trump threatened upon retaking the Oval Office has not materialised– yet. Instead, targeted tariffs appear to be the new game. However, it is becoming clear that these threats are not necessarily meant to be carried out. Rather, Trump is wielding them as a stick without a carrot to extract concessions from allies. He seems to understand that imposing 25% tariffs on major trading partners would be immediately felt by US voters at the grocery store. But he also knows that no country istruly positioned to call his bluff. For the UK, drawing clear lessons from this approach is difficult.
The UK might look to Canada and Mexico for clues on how to avoid tariffs, but the logic behind Trump’s ire is confounding. He cited fentanyl and illegal migration as justification for the tariffs. However, Canada only accounts for 0.2% of fentanyl seizures at the border and only 1.5% of Border Patrol encounters. Even before the tariffs were threatened, Trudeau had already committed over a billion Canadian dollars to new border security measures. It didn’t matter though – Trump proceeded with the threats anyway. It was only hours before the tariffs were to come into force that a ‘deal’ was agreed between the president and prime minister. Similarly, President Sheinbaum of Mexico secured a verbal deal by agreeing to deploy 10,000 Mexican troops to the border.
This unpredictability leaves the UK with little guidance on how to prepare for potential tariff threats. It is difficult to anticipate the reasoning Trump might use—largely because it may not be based in reality. He has also demonstrated that tariff threats are swift and sweeping, leaving targeted countries scrambling to appease rather than negotiate. For now, Trump’s sights are set on the UK’s recent ex, the EU. But the UK will likely not be able to employ the same playbook. Trump has declared that tariffs on EU goods will happen “pretty soon.” In response, the EU has pledged to retaliate with tariffs of its own.
The UK, however, is in a weaker position to retaliate. Even though Trump has said that he and Starmer are “getting along very well,” this goodwill might buy the UK some time, but not immunity. If Trump turns his attention to the UK, tariff retaliation on US imports is unlikely to be an effective strategy. Tariffs would do little to hurt the US economy but could severely impact UK businesses. Additionally, UK-US trade leans far more heavily towards services than goods. While Trump’s tariffs so far have targeted goods, a UK retaliation would escalate the situation and potentially lead to UK services being targeted as well.
One factor working in the UK’s favour, apart from Trump finding Starmer to be ‘very nice’, is that the US runs a trade surplus in goods exported to the UK. This puts the UK in a position only shared by four other countries and could help curry favour with a mercurial Trump.
As for the EU, a last-minute deal may be far more difficult than it was for Canada and Mexico. Trump has long been a staunch critic of the EU, and his demands are likely to be extensive. If the issue is the EU’s trade deficit with the US, some concessions—such as increased purchases of American vehicles or liquified natural gas—might be possible. However, if Trump’s fixation turns to Greenland or if he targets the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), meaningful concessions may be impossible. As a result, a tariff war between the US and EU looks highly likely.
Ultimately, the lessons for the UK to glean seem scarce. Trump has successfully wielded the tariffs stick against major trading partners and shown that it can work. He has also shown that no ally is immune, and the UK doesn’t have the leverage (or economic power) to call his bluff. For now, Starmer’s cautious approach seems prudent.
Unfortunately, it seems not a question of ‘if’ Trump will target the UK, only ‘when, and for what?’.