The Government insists it is taking defence seriously. But this week’s intervention by Chancellor Rachel Reeves suggests that the ambition remains constrained by political caution and hard economic limits – despite rising global instability and an American administration demanding more from its allies. Speaking at a Financial Times event on Tuesday, Reeves reaffirmed that the UK would lift defence and intelligence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027, but not beyond – at least not during this parliament. That means no new money until after the next general election, expected in 2029.
Planners behind the recent Strategic Defence Review have made it clear: the UK ambitions, from rearming to rebuilding industrial depth, cannot be met unless spending hits at least 3.5% of GDP by 2034. That leaves a significant gap between stated goals and current funding, and it puts pressure on Labour to clarify not just its “ambition” to hit 3%, but how and when it intends to pay for it. Reeves argued that existing spending plans represent the most sustained defence uplift since the Cold War, and are fully funded.
But the reality is that Britain currently spends around 2.3% of GDP on defence.
The additional 0.3 percentage point rise will largely be funded by a sharp cut to the UK’s overseas aid budget.
That trade-off may satisfy fiscal conservatives, but it also highlights the zero-sum logic driving Treasury decisions – and the narrow room for manoeuvre on the international stage.
Support for further investment exists. A YouGov poll conducted on 4,912 GB adults on June 2 found that 49% of UK adults believe defence spending should increase. Just 11% want to see it reduced, while 22% favour keeping it at current levels. In an age of war fatigue, political polarisation and fiscal pressure, such numbers offer a rare degree of clarity — and, potentially, a mandate.
But that clarity has yet to translate into urgency.
Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer continues to say that 3% is an “ambition” for the next parliament, and Downing Street is expected to back NATO’s proposed new baseline of 3.5% by 2035. But for now, Britain remains stuck in a familiar posture: promises of future strength, delayed by present-day caution.
The Treasury has pushed back on suggestions it is dragging its heels, saying it would be a “misreading” of Reeves’ comments to conclude that future increases are off the table.
“Defending our country is the government’s first responsibility,” said a spokesperson. “The Spending Review provided the funding necessary to deliver that.”
A further review will take place in two years’ time, but for many in defence, the bigger questions are already looming: what will be left of the UK’s defence industrial base by then, how will NATO threats evolve, and how far behind the curve will Britain have fallen?
With global threats rising and allies like the United States growing more transactional in their security guarantees, the current approach may not hold. The next two years could prove pivotal — not only for Britain’s armed forces, but for its credibility as a serious defence power.
In the meantime it leaves us, says Crump, “spreading the margarine over too much bread.”