Kim Jong-un’s rare decision to blame Russia for battlefield failures in Ukraine is less about Moscow and more about the fragility of his own regime, according to an expert. The North Korean leader has publicly wept for fallen soldiers and aired documents acknowledging heavy losses. North Korea is thought to have contributed around 10,000 soldiers to Vladimir Putin’s war, of which, according to intelligence sources in South Korea, more than 1,000 troops have been killed in action and some 4,000 wounded.
Footage shown on Korean Central Television displayed internal military reports signed by Kim. One document stated that “Russian army units failed to expand the offensive results, and as a result the special operations forces units could not secure the flanks,” leading to “serious losses.” Another report detailed operations in Kursk, where North Korean brigades covered dozens of square kilometres while Russian troops faltered. The broadcast combined shots of documents with combat footage from the Russian border city of Sudzha. North Korean soldiers were shown storming houses, launching drones and even capturing Ukrainian troops.
Yet analysts believe much of the material was staged, filmed after the fighting had ended to exaggerate Pyongyang’s role and downplay Russia’s.
Joost Oliemans, an expert on the Korean People’s Army, said the criticism of Russia was “fairly accurate” given the difficulties faced early in the deployment.
“The North Korean military hierarchy is independent from the Russian one,” he told NK News. “Whereas the Russians tend to have incentives to downplay issues, the North Koreans had the opposite incentive, considering who was running the show.”
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, agreed that the documents showed “some tension between the North Korean and Russian staff” but warned that “nothing is left to chance in North Korean propaganda.”
But Mykola Kuzmin of the Henry Jackson Society, said the significance lies not in the alliance but in the regime’s own insecurity.
“He could not justify why those soldiers died in Ukraine,” Kuzmin said. “During his New Year remarks, he shed tears, but many North Koreans do not even know where Ukraine is. For them it is incredibly tragic. That is why he is now putting blame on Russians. It is a justification for people and a justification for the regime.”
Kim’s efforts to frame the losses come at a sensitive moment.
Younger North Koreans are less loyal ideologically and are increasingly exposed to foreign culture through smuggled USB sticks.
Many bribe officials to avoid mobilisation, while food insecurity continues to affect large sections of the population.
“The regime is more vulnerable than we think it is,” Kuzmin said. “They passed the anti-reactionary thought law in 2020 to crack down on outside culture, which is itself a sign of insecurity. Everyday people are asking why sacrifice is needed when shortages persist.”
Analysts also point to Kim’s presentation of his young daughter at high-profile events as a sign of dynastic anxiety.
“He is portrayed as the son of the nation, the sun that shines over all people, but he is now building up his daughter’s image as inevitable successor,” Kuzmin said.
“It tells you something may be happening with his health too.”
Kim, a heavy smoker and drinker with a family history of heart disease, has long faced speculation about diabetes and kidney problems.
He has removed senior commanders who might challenge his rule, leaving the dynasty as the only option for succession.
Despite the propaganda, Pyongyang’s alliance with Moscow remains transactional.
Russia receives manpower and engineers, while North Korea gains missile expertise and diplomatic cover.
Moscow has promised to build memorials to North Korean soldiers in Kursk, even as Pyongyang conceals Russian involvement in its broadcasts.
“Russia pretends it never asked for North Korean help, and North Korea pretends it does not need Russia,” Kuzmin said. “Both regimes are performing theatre to mask weaknesses. Their coffins tell a truer story than parades.”
For Kim, the greatest risk may not be the battlefield but the perception at home.
“This story is not really about the relationship with Russia,” Kuzmin said. “It is about the fragility of the Kim regime, and that’s a very real issue.”